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A B S T R A C T

Transantiago, the public transport system implemented in Santiago, Chile, remains a controversial subject of
public debate due to constantly increasing fare evasion rates throughout its decade-long existence. The research
question under consideration in this paper is what motivates individuals to evade or pay bus fares. To answer
this question, we developed a multidisciplinary study that combined relevant engineering expertise with a sociological perspective and combined quantitative analyses with qualitative methodologies to include new
variables and categories that previous studies on the subject have omitted. We formulated a survey, which was
administered to 503 public transport system users. The data we obtained were analyzed using a factor analysis.
As a result, six dimensions were identified that explain motivations for fare evasion: (1) behavior and social
norms, (2) the public transport service’s image, (3) social acceptance of evasion, (4) trip planning, (5) antievasion methods, and (6) fear of law enforcement.

Introduction
An important aspect of today’s economy and market interaction is
consumer misbehavior, which can be defined as behavioral acts by consumers that violate the generally accepted norms of conduct in consumption situations, disrupting the social order (Fullerton and Punj,
2004). The literature identifies a wide variety of consumer misbehavior
patterns (Mazar et al., 2008; Daunt and Harris, 2011; van Jaarsveld et al.
2015; Cai et al., 2018). This research further explores a specific but
widespread example present in Transantiago (renamed Red Metropolitan
Mobility Network in March 2019), the public transport system in Santiago,
Chile, where avoiding bus fare payment has become normal. This provides
the potential for analysis that goes beyond individual decision making to
investigating fare payment evasion as a social phenomenon.
Transantiago’s 2007 inception was aimed at a complete transformation
of the city’s method of organizing buses and other public transport services. Some changes involved integrating the bus system with the Santiago
Metro service, but the process entailed a variety of other adjustments,
including the creation of operating companies to provide trunk and feeder
services; the implementation of a fare-payment method by touchless smart
card—the so-called Bip! card—to facilitate a swifter process; and, consequently, the imposition of a restricted role for drivers that discharged them
from their duties as fare collectors, responsible for ensuring payment from
each customer (Muñoz and Gschwender, 2008). The past decade’s redefinition of the system has improved its efficiency, as well as user evaluations of the service (Muñoz et al., 2014); nevertheless, Transantiago’s
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management still lacks social approval (Adimark, 2017) and fare evasion
rates continue to increase. According to official data collected by the
Metropolitan Public Transport Directory (DTPM), when Transantiago initially launched, the incidence of fare evasion ranged from 11% to 16%.
Although these rates have varied over time, the phenomenon has been on
the rise, reaching 35% in 2016 and an average of 27% between 2017 and
2019.
To date, the authorities’ response to fare evasion has been oriented toward criminalizing the act; they have focused on proposing control measures
intended to minimize the associated economic loss. From the public transport users’ perspective, the main problem involves service frequency (DTPM
2017). While most users regard evasion as a dishonest act with harmful
consequences for other passengers, opinions diverge regarding the extent to
which it is acceptable on certain occasions or even constitutes a valid mode
of protest.
On one hand, this phenomenon has become more than mere rulebreaking; it has evolved into a problem concerning social order in which
individuals no longer perceive the licit act as the only legitimate mode of
conduct. In accordance with this diversification of social expectations
(Luhmann, 2004), the current research is also aimed at broadening the
scope of observation as it affects public transport users; as such, it focuses
not only on fare evaders, but also on the perceptions of those who regularly
pay for transportation. Consequently, the research question is: What motivations are involved in determining whether users evade or pay bus fares?
The assumptions underpinning this question are that evasion within the
Transantiago system is a social phenomenon, so the attendant explanation
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transport as part of an overall system such as a city or society, nor question
how public transport’s function is being fulfilled within this overall system.
Most studies on fare evasion have focused on explanations related to
macroeconomic issues and existing infrastructure by estimating econometric
models. Their methodologies are usually based on surveys administered to
onboard users or historical information about fare evasion, and they explain
the phenomenon using variables such as operational factors, bus characteristics, and the presence of barriers (Dauby and Kovacs, 2007; Barabino
et al. 2014; Sasaki, 2014; Guarda et al. 2016b; Tirachini and Villanueva,
2016; Troncoso and de Grange, 2017; Cools et al., 2017). In terms of existing infrastructure that favors evasion, studies indicate that more evasion
occurs on buses with more doors, higher occupancy rates, and during rush
hour (Lee, 2011; Guarda et al. 2016a; Guarda et al. 2016b).
On the other hand, the operators’ contract characteristics constitute another relevant factor, revealing that the absence of economic incentives favors
evasion (Torres-Montoya, 2014). Payment system design also has a direct
impact, as proof-of-payment public transport systems—such as Transantiago—are more vulnerable to fare evasion (Dauby and Kovacs, 2007). Systems
with enter barriers—adopted by most metro systems and currently by some
bus operators in Santiago—provide fewer opportunities for evasion (Reddy
et al., 2011). However, each payment system has an impact on costs that
must be considered (Sasaki, 2014; Welde, 2012; Tirachini, 2011).
Another well addressed point in the literature corresponds to the inspection levels necessary to reduce fare evasion rates. In general, higher
inspection rates and higher fines discourage evasion (Dauby and Kovacs,
2007; Killias et al., 2009; Tirachini and Villanueva, 2016); however, there
are situations where these measures do not have such a clear effect (Clarke
et al., 2010; Buehler, Halbheer, and Lechner, 2017). Some researchers have
formulated optimization models to determine the most efficient control
levels by using information sources such as the probability of an evader
being monitored, the monetary value of the fine, and the user’s level of risk
aversion (Barabino et al., 2013, 2014; Barabino and Salis, 2019, Guarda
et al. 2016a). In this same line of research, other investigations have proposed models for optimizing fare inspection strategies in transit networks
based on bilevel programming or attacker-defender Stackelberg security
games (Correa et al. 2017; Delfau ret al., 2018; Delle Fave et al. 2014).
As mentioned in Currie and Delbosc (2017), two assumptions can be
identified in most of the aforementioned studies: first, fare evasion includes
any circumstance in which the traveler was able to pay but did not do so,
and second, such evasion was deliberate. Few studies consider fare evasion
as consumer misbehavior. Instead, they focus on identifying categories such
as types of evasion, main attributes of evaders, and the reasons why people
evade payment (Suquet, 2010; Bucciol et al., 2013; Barabino et al., 2015;
Delbosc and Currie 2016a; Delbosc and Currie 2016b; Currie and Delbosc,
2017; Salis et al., 2017; González et al., 2019). Currie and Delbosc (2017)
made the most meaningful efforts to understand why people evade, developing two models to explain deliberate and unintentional public transport fare evasion in Melbourne, Australia. They concluded that attributes
associated with honesty, ease of evasion, and permissive attitudes toward
evasion were key factors that explain deliberate evasion. In the case of
unintentional evaders, honesty and permissive attitudes were likewise significant, though “ticketing competence” also affected these evaders.
According to the economic model of human behavior, people pursue
dishonest acts consciously and deliberately by making trade-offs between
the expected external benefits and the costs of the dishonest act (Becker,
2000; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). However, fare evasion cannot be
explained solely by a cost-benefit analysis. Mazar et al. (2008) concluded
that people engage in dishonest behavior to benefit from it, but they want to
maintain a positive view of themselves as honest individuals. Likewise, Erat
and Gneezy (2011) studied when and why it is important for individuals to
choose to lie in the context of an economic and social interaction. They
concluded that aversion to lying cannot be explained with the theory of
guilt based on monetary consequences. Instead, they showed that a person’s
beliefs in a given context affect aversion to lying and explain guilt.
Daunt and Harris (2011) found that consumer misbehavior can be
explained by personality and sociodemographic factors, but these connections are not direct. Instead, these variables explain future misbehavior
indirectly through consumers’ past misbehavior. The authors found that
past experiences of consumer misbehavior are associated with future
misbehavior intentions, and that gender—among other variables—plays
an important role in determining individuals’ ethical perceptions. Male
customers are more likely to have engaged in past consumer misbehavior

cannot be limited to an account of individuals’ simple economic interests
and the incentives and disincentives authorities can impose.
To answer the question raised above, we developed a multidisciplinary
study that combined relevant engineering expertise with a sociological
perspective, as well as quantitative analysis with qualitative methodologies, to facilitate the inclusion of new variables that previous studies on the
subject omitted. Given that our main objective is to identify the motivations that drive the actions of evaders and non-evaders, we first present a
framework that identifies the social norms related to evasion and nonevasion, Transantiago’s image, travel characteristics, structural aspects,
control measures, users’ behavior, and sociodemographic characteristics.
Two main contributions can be highlighted in this research. First, the
inclusion of non-evaders enables us to better understand the phenomenon
and avoid stigmatizing evaders. Although some authors have included nonavoidant users in the analysis (Delbosc and Currie 2016a, Currie and
Delbosc, 2017), we enrich their vision by considering non-evaders as part of
a social context influenced by acts of protest against inequity, affecting the
acceptance of the official rule. In this case, non-evaders perceptions can help
us understand why evaders don´t resist their misbehavior. Second, we developed a methodology that starts with a qualitative phase to explore new
elements that were not considered in previous studies, such as socials norms
and social acceptance of fare evasion. Although this is a common methodological strategy in scientific research, local authorities and researchers
have focused only on the transport system’s structural aspects, such as the
number of bus doors or the presence of turnstiles, as well as control measures, such as the number of inspectors or fine prices. None of the measures
suggested and implemented have diminished Transantiago’s fare evasion
problem, so decision-makers need new elements to consider in order to reduce economic losses. Finally, both arguments have methodological consequences beyond the classic microeconomic model that has prevailed in the
analysis of Transantiago´s evasion problem, and both allow the stakeholders
involved in the decision-making process to observe the phenomenon from a
different perspective.
During the editing process of this paper, a social crisis of great
magnitude in Santiago de Chile—and then throughout the country—began with users’ reaction to the rise in public transport fare.
Riders, organized for years through social networks, called for evading
the metro ticket, a transport mode that until then had presented low
levels of evasion.
This research aims to understand the different motivations behind the
act of paying or not paying the bus fare within the Santiago de Chile public
transport system. As a case study, it allows readers to observe a radical
evasion phenomenon and witness how—in certain poorly managed circumstances and along with certain social characteristics—evasion can
become a complex issue associated with a problem of social legitimacy
(Suchman, 1995). This paper demonstrates that given this complexity, the
problem will not be resolved by improving specific aspects of the travel
experience. Public transport is not an isolated system, but a function imbedded in society that is perceived within a social context. In this specific
case, public transportation is associated with elements of protest or contentious actions that are rooted in a feeling of inequity. Although this
contextual characteristic is difficult to replicate, this research proposes a
more comprehensive approach to a consumer misbehavior problem that
any public transport system may face and emphasizes the importance of
viewing that problem through a social perspective to unveil its complexity.
Theoretical background
Fare evasion, as an example of consumer misbehavior, afflicts every
public transport system worldwide and creates several uniform disadvantages such as loss of income, detrimental impacts on the public
transport system’s corporate image, damage to the quality of the service
provided, and an increased public sense of insecurity (Bonfanti and
Wagenknecht, 2010; Reddy et al., 2011).
In the literature, various approaches can be identified to study fare
evasion in public transport. According to Delbosc and Currie (2019), three
approaches include the conventional transit system perspective, the customer profiling perspective, and the customer motivations perspective. In
Barabino et al. (2020), the classification is extended to five main areas:
fare evader-oriented, criminological, economic, technological, and operational. None of these develop a social perspective that understands public
2
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resides, purpose of the journey, duration of the journey on the current bus,
how many days of the week the traveler uses Transantiago buses, whether
the traveler also uses the metro during this journey, whether the traveler
has an alternative to the bus, and which alternative that is. The second set
contained 42 items related to the phenomenon of evasion that could be
answered using a Likert scale of four values ranked according to level of
agreement (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree) and a fifth
alternative when items did not apply. A complete list of the questions is
included in Appendix Table A1.
The third set of questions encompassed items recorded by observers:
bus operator, route, number of bus doors, and presence of a turnstile. In
addition, respondents provided observable data about the user such as
gender, nationality (Chilean/other), whether the user evaded the fare
when boarding the bus, the tactic used to evade (e.g., boarding the bus
using the back door, asking for permission but not paying the fare,
using a Bip! card that is out of funds), whether the user boarded the bus
at a pay zone, and the city district in which the user boarded the bus.
The sample was selected strategically using a simple procedure. First,
given that the purpose of this methodological approach was to understand
both evasion and non-evasion, official data from DTPM listing the bus
routes with the lowest to the highest evasion rates were grouped into
quintiles. From the 50 routes selected for the sample, 48% of the buses
boarded by the survey team belonged to the routes of the first quintile
(lowest evasion rates) and the other 52% belonged to fifth quintile
(highest evasion rates). Once on the bus, researchers observed user behavior—fare payment or fare evasion—and after recording the behavior
on the questionnaire, approached users over 18 years old to collect the
additional information. Since the evasion behavior was observed and not
asked of the respondent, evaders did not perceive the questions as judgmental and openly answered them. This methodology allowed for observation-based precision concerning traveler behavior. Therefore, the
assumption implied in this methodology is that the individual who was
observed not paying the fare is considered an evader, regardless of whether that evasion was circumstantial or not.
The data collection occurred during July 2018, between 9:00 a.m. and
6:00 p.m., and before starting with each questionnaire, subjects were introduced to the study’s purpose and asked to sign an informed consent
(previously approved by the ethics committee of the Diego Portales
University, Santiago, Chile). After the pilot experiment, researchers facilitated the process by providing travelers with the Likert scale answers on
a sheet of paper for them to see, while the research team asked each
question and recorded the responses. This technique was much faster, allowing survey completion in 12 min. The main difficulty encountered in
applying the survey instrument was the duration of the journey. When rides
were short, surveys were incomplete and consequently had to be discarded.
A total of 503 valid surveys were obtained, of which 253 were
completed by evaders and 250 were completed by non-evaders. The
total valid respondents are approximately 75% of the users approached
by researchers. Table 1 presents the descriptive summary of the sample.

than females. This tendency can also be observed in some public transport
systems. Bucciol et al. (2013) used survey data from the bus system in
Reggio Emilia, Italy, and concluded that there is a greater probability that
young non-European men will not carry a valid ticket. A similar analysis
performed by Barabino et al. (2015) for the bus system of Cagliari, Italy,
found that young men under 26 years of age with low education levels,
unemployed or student status, and no alternatives to taking the bus were
likelier to evade payment.
Finally, several studies have shown that climate and ethical culture are
important predictors of the frequency of unethical acts within groups and
organizational environments (Loe et al., 2000; Ford and Richardson, 2013).
Gino et al. (2009) concluded that people react to others’ unethical behavior,
and those reactions depend on their own social norms as well as the individual relevance assigned to dishonesty. In addition, they suggested that
peer influence is an important factor in the explanation of unethical behavior and observed that, under certain conditions, dishonest behavior can be
contagious. In that sense, another consequence of evasion could be that it
leads non-evaders to change their behavior, due to this effect on others.
Methodology
This study’s research design can be described as exploratory,
quantitative–qualitative, transversal, non-probabilistic, and empirical.
It is exploratory because it seeks to identify new elements that were not
previously referred by the literature. A good way to accomplish this is
by using qualitative techniques that are then complemented by a
quantitative phase that allows for statistical analysis. It is a transversal,
non-probabilistic, and empirical design because the data were collected
in a limited period of time (July 18) using a sample based on a strategic
selection and therefore cannot allow for a probabilistic analysis. Fig. 1
illustrates the research process and each step’s output.
The qualitative phase was developed to identify new elements involved
in Transantiago’s fare evasion problem. Four focus groups held during May
2018 included 27 university students who were assigned to the following
groups: users who never evade fares and consider evasion wrong, users
who evade fares occasionally and consider evasion correct in specific
cases, individuals who usually evade, and users who always evade fares
and justify it. Student selection was conducted through on an online
questionnaire in which students were asked how they described themselves in terms of fare evasion. Groups were composed of six to seven
students from different schools and gender, and conversations lasted between 70 and 90 min. The set of 10 questions were related to three general
dimensions: vision of Transantiago and evasion, perception on specific
aspects of the travel, and expectations of public transport.
One of the conclusions drawn from this qualitative approach was that
the evasion phenomenon encompasses a broad spectrum of behaviors based
on the degree of intention to evade, consistent with what Delbosc and Currie
(2016b) and Suquet (2005) reported. Although most focus group participants considered fare evasion wrong, many thought it was justifiable for a
large segment of the population, such as senior citizens, children, students,
and people with low incomes. In some cases, this social justification has
ideological and political bases, but in most circumstances, individuals offered a moral justification based on socioeconomic inequities.
Finally, using the information gathered from the focus groups and
literature review, we developed a preliminary conceptual map (Fig. 2)
where the seven inner boxes represent the dimension that would explain motivation (social norms; image of public transport system; travel
characteristics; structural aspects of the system; control factors; user´s
behavior; and sociodemographic characteristics), and each dimension is
composed of several variables that allow their operationalization
(smaller boxes). For example, one dimension that could explain evasion
is the perceived image of public transport, which in turn would be influenced by the perception of the safety and quality of public transport,
the image that the group closest to the user may have, or the satisfaction that users have with the service. In the same way, the behavior of
users could also explain evasion, which in turn would be determined by
the attitude toward evasion, the levels of planning before traveling, and
the ideology that users may have regarding evasion.
From this conceptual map, a survey was created to collect quantitative
data containing 61 items that were further divided into three sets of
questions. The first set requested traveler data, including 10 items: age,
type of work or activity, type of contract, city district in which the traveler

Results and discussion
The answers to the 42 items answered with the Likert scale were
used for the factor analysis. The database was tested with the KaiserMeyer-Olkin measure (KMO) of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of
sphericity to verify the pertinence of this information reduction technique. Nine items were discarded from the analysis since they presented
low communality. KMO shows a value of 0.92, indicating high correlations, and Bartlett’s test yielded a significance value less than 0.05.
From the database analysis, the six factors were selected that together
explain 58% of the variance in the data, thereby allowing for the construction of a new conceptual map, simplifying the number of variables for
further research. The six factors analyzed (including each percentage of
explained variance) were: (1) behavior and social norms (30%); (2) the
public transport service’s image (10%); (3) social acceptance of evasion
(6%); (4) trip planning (5%); (5) anti-evasion methods (4%); and (6) fear
of law enforcement (3%).
The percentage of explained variance does not appear as relevant in
literature for factor selection in an exploratory factor analysis. The main
element considered in bibliographical references is Kaiser´s rule, which establishes the retention of factors having eigenvalues from the unreduced
correlation matrix that are greater than 1 (Pituch and Stevens, 2016; Yong
3
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Research Method
Bibliographic Research

Qualita�ve Phase

Quan�ta�ve Phase

Outputs
• Iden�ﬁca�on of variables
• New research ques�ons

• Set of ques�ons for focus
groups

• Iden�ﬁca�on of new
variables

• 1st Conceptual Map
• Quan�ta�ve
ques�onnaire

• Data gathering
• Factor analysis

• 2nd Conceptual Map

Fig. 1. Methodological process.

Fig. 2. Motivation to fare evasion/payment initial conceptual map.

and Pearce, 2013). This is the case for all six factors selected for this study.
Another pertinent parameter is the factor loading (the factor loadings matrix
is presented in Appendix Table A2), expecting that in social sciences items
strongly conform a factor when communalities are between.40 and.70
(Costello and Osborne, 2005), but it is acceptable even from.30 (Pituch and
Stevens, 2016). According to the latter, only the trip planning factor would
be weak, showing correlations between.30 and.40. Nevertheless, trip planning appears as relevant to the research question (Yong and Pearce, 2013)
and conceptually coherent (Pituch and Stevens, 2016), showing important
information for policy makers, and enlightening further research.
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the calculation of means and
standard deviations for each of the 42 items and differentiates between

evaders and non-evaders. While it is possible to distinguish differences
of opinion within each category of users, an aggregate analysis focusing
on the proposed dimensions was chosen for this study. The research
team also included a mean difference test and developed a boxplot for
each item and dimension (see Figs. A1–A6 in the Appendix).
Behavior and social norms
This dimension explains 30% of the variance in the data and
meaningfully facilitates an improved understanding of evasion as a
social phenomenon that cannot be adequately explained only as an
4
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legal or illegal acts. This dimension also refers to specific behaviors when
using public transport, such as using the Bip! card when boarding a bus or
keeping available funds on the card, but focuses on the significance attached to those acts. Beyond an individual definition, this dimension indicates that public transport fare evasion is a social act, as it is observed,
evaluated, and approved of or punished by others.
For example, regarding the item that reflects the strongest correlation in
this dimension, “Evasion is a dishonest act,” 43% of those who did not pay
the fare agreed with that statement, demonstrating a rejection of conceiving of evasion as a dishonest act. By contrast, 90% of those who paid
the bus fare agreed with the statement. Regarding the item “Evasion is
disrespectful,” 39% of evaders agreed, compared with 85% of non-evaders.
The data presented in Table 2 allow us to infer that, with regard to a
normative evaluation of bus fare payment, there were significant differences
between users who paid the bus fare and users who did not. This situation
can be applied to findings presented by Mazar et al. (2008), who stated that
individuals behave dishonestly, but only up to a certain limit. This limit
allows them to benefit from a dishonest act, but only when that act is
neither bad nor blameworthy enough to change the individual’s positive
self-concept.
In this context, group definitions assume a critical role in the legitimacy and normality with which evasion is judged. The existence of
groups and individuals who publicly defend the practice of evasion, in
combination with daily observations of the phenomenon, allows people to
avoid conceiving of evasion as something with a negative moral value or
experiencing a damaged self-concept when evading bus fares.

Table 1
Descriptive Summary of the Sample.
Characteristics
Gender
Men
Women
Nationality
Chilean
Foreign
Age (years)
< 19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–59
60–more
Activity
Employee
Unemployed
College student
School student
Housewife
Retired
City District Living
West
South East
North
East
South
Center
Travel Time (minutes)
< 20
20–40
40–60
> 60
Travel Purpose
Work
Study
Other
Use Metro
Yes
No

Evaders %

Non-evaders %

57%
44%

43%
56%

51%
42%

49%
58%

79%
51%
51%
49%
19%
25%

21%
49%
49%
51%
81%
75%

41%
65%
50%
58%
66%
52%

59%
35%
50%
42%
34%
48%

61%
48%
54%
19%
54%
44%

39%
52%
46%
81%
46%
56%

50%
54%
39%
40%

50%
46%
61%
60%

36%
43%
58%

64%
57%
42%

33%
60%

67%
40%

Sample %
100%
51%
49%
100%
95%
5%
100%
13%
41%
20%
13%
10%
3%
100%
51%
8%
22%
8%
10%
1%
100%
34%
25%
13%
11%
10%
7%
100%
40%
45%
11%
3%
100%
30%
6%
64%
100%
37%
63%

The public transport service’s image
This dimension explains 10% of the variance in the data and is
composed of the items shown in Table 3. Santiago’s transport service’s
image is related to users’ expectations and perceptions. Perceptions are
the subjective opinions of users and people close to them regarding
issues such as quality, safety, and satisfaction.
Unlike behavior and social norms, this dimension is characterized by a
less pronounced difference between the perceptions of evaders and nonevaders. For example, regarding the item “The bus service reflects concerns
about users’ well-being,” only 15% of evaders agreed and a similar proportion (17%) of non-evaders agreed. In the same way, the items referencing that Transantiago’s buses are safe, clean, and regularly serviced and
maintained showed virtually no difference in perception between the
groups.
On the other hand, comparing the general perception of
Transantiago’s bus service with the perception of the specific bus on
which the user was traveling at the time of the survey reveals interesting
distinctions. There is a significant increase in the percentage of agreement, from 21% to 44% in evaders and from 33% to 59% in non-evaders.
As a result, it can be argued that Transantiago’s image is a complex social
construct and that it does not necessarily show a strict correlation with
individual experiences. Therefore, improving specific aspects of the travel

individual or illegal act. Therefore, evasion can also be understood as a
conduct that is subject to evaluation, whether positive or negative, from
the perspective of social norms, which are defined as tacit agreements
under the control of peers (Luhmann, 1985).
Table 2 shows the items and factor loadings related to this dimension
and the percentage of agreement between evaders and non-evaders regarding each item. One of the most enlightening elements relates to values, such as honesty, respect, and responsibility, and items associated
with the moral evaluation of a conduct, which go beyond its definition as
Table 2
Items and Factor Loadings Related to Behavior and Social Norms.
Item

Evasion is a dishonest act
Evasion is disrespectful
Evasion damages other passengers
All public transport users should validate their Bip! cards upon boarding a bus
It is annoying when those who evade payment find a place to sit
Evasion is an irresponsible act
It is right to pay the bus fare
Not paying the bus fare is an illicit act
With more places in which to charge the Bip! card, there is no excuse to evade
My family values influence my behavior about paying bus fares
Evasion produces a feeling of guilt
Evasion is an acceptable action in some cases
I am afraid of sanctions for the act of evading payment
It is evasion when a Bip! card is not validated after being used on the metro
a

Factor Loadings

.796
.779
.698
.693
.662
.658
.657
.597
.580
.576
.566
.564
.526
.507

The mean difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
5

Agree + Strongly Agree
Evaders

Non-evaders

43%
39%
37%
63%
35%
42%
70%
41%
57%
45%
35%
81%
52%
38%

90%
85%
81%
95%
80%
82%
97%
83%
82%
87%
68%
47%
81%
78%

Mean Difference Test-t

12.68a
12.45a
11.41a
11.66a
11.75a
9.98a
11.15a
10.52a
7.35a
12.04a
7.95a
9.07a
6.21a
10.22a
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Table 3
Items and Factor Loadings Related to the Public Transport Service’s Image.
Item

Factor Loadings

I am satisfied with Transantiago’s bus service
The bus service reflects concerns about users’ well-being
I am satisfied with this bus’s service
People close to me are satisfied with Transantiago’s buses
Transantiago’s buses are safe
Transantiago’s buses are clean
Transantiago’s buses are regularly serviced and maintained
Ticket fare is cheap
The frequency of bus service suits my needs
a

Agree + Strongly Agree

.724
.639
.599
.594
.583
.568
.534
.458
.425

Mean Difference Test-t

Evaders

Non-evaders

21%
15%
44%
13%
18%
16%
13%
6%
33%

33%
17%
59%
19%
20%
15%
18%
15%
42%

3.73a
1.59
3.01a
3.28a
0.05
0.67
1.15
3.37a
2.89a

The mean difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

Table 4
Items and Factor Loadings Related to Social Acceptance of Evasion.
Item

Factor Loadings

If I lose my Bip! card, it is acceptable for me to evade payment
It is acceptable to evade payment if my card is out of funds
Evasion is a valid way of protesting
In general, evasion has become an acceptable act
a

Agree + Strongly Agree

-0.623
-0.601
-0.455
-0.429

Mean Difference Test-t

Evaders

Non-evaders

75%
80%
68%
74%

29%
48%
37%
66%

10.51a
8.73a
8.77a
1.47

The mean difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

Table 5
Items and Factor Loadings Related to Trip Planning.
Item

Factor Loadings

I am concerned about keeping funds on my Bip! card
I am concerned about remembering to bring my Bip! card with me when I plan to
take the bus
a

.708
.694

Agree + Strongly Agree
Evaders

Non-evaders

48%
57%

84%
90%

Mean Difference Test-t

18.48a
15.63a

The mean difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

Table 6
Items and Factor Loadings Related to Ineffective Anti-evasion Methods.
Item

The turnstile is a useful method for reducing evasion
The fine stops evasion

Factor Loadings

Agree + Strongly Agree

.624
.584

Mean Difference Test-t

Evaders

Non-evaders

42%
31%

46%
35%

0.58
0.06

Table 7
Items and Factor Loadings Related to Fear of Law Enforcement.
Item

It is frightening to evade when there is a Bip! card inspector
If the penalty fee were higher, I would think twice before evading
a

Factor Loadings

.301
.339

Agree + Strongly Agree
Evaders

Non-evaders

75%
64%

86%
85%

Mean Difference Test-t

3.50a
6.52a

The mean difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

experience is not sufficient to change users’ collective impression of
Transantiago. Caution should likely be exercised in investing in advertising campaigns, expecting to promote payment based on a quality improvement.
Finally, although both evaders and non-evaders have a negative
perception regarding Transantiago, the image factor remains relevant. The qualitative phase shows that this bad image is the main
argument used to justify evasion and accept it in others, motivating
evaders to elude payment and giving non-evaders a reason to accept
this conduct.

Social acceptance of evasion
This dimension explains 6% of the variance in the data, and the
items reflect various situations in which evasion becomes acceptable
(Table 4). It is important to note that acceptable norms do not necessarily square with the law. Legal regulations have been selected from
a larger group of norms and legitimized through a politically valid
procedure by the state, which is thereby able to enforce such regulatory
norms via organizations established for that purpose (Luhmann, 1985).
6
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Fig. 3. Motivation for fare evasion and payment - final conceptual map.

cards and ensure that sufficient funds are available for the trip
(Bucknell et al. 2016). In this context, individuals who have forgotten to
do this are forced to board the bus without paying the fare. Something
similar happens to those who reside in areas where they must walk
significant distances to charge their Bip! cards. This can be a meaningful obstacle for women, children, and elderly people.
These situations require a more rigorous temporal perspective when
planning trips, which is especially relevant for those who do not recognize
evasion as legitimate conduct in any circumstances, but less relevant for
those who regard occasional evasion as permissible—and know that the
behavior will meet with general social acceptance within their environment. Finally, the possibility of charging the Bip! card monthly requires
users to have a significant sum of money on hand on a given day, which is
not viable for students and individuals with low incomes.
Currently the system offers a loan through Bip! cards for those who
do not have sufficient funds to complete an additional trip. Bucknell
et al. (2016) show that fare evasion could also be reduced by extending
the time window of a loan.

Contradictory norms can therefore coexist within a society where only
those norms established as legitimate by the state are regarded as legal.
Evasion, when considered an illegal act that consists of nonpayment
of public transport fares, lies within a gray area concerning the empiric
definition of such conduct. Although evasion is illegal, individuals’
disapproval of the behavior seems relative, given the apparent existence
of certain conditions in which evasion is considered acceptable and the
fact that this acceptance has increased among users.
This dimension is also defined by a strong difference of opinion between evaders and non-evaders, which permits a more precise characterization of each group. Nevertheless, even though non-evaders disagree
more strenuously with the statements presented in Table 4 than evaders
do, certain circumstances seem more acceptable to non-evaders, especially
when they find themselves with insufficient funds on their Bip! cards. This
raises the possibility of an extant subgroup of non-evaders who pay the
fare and reject evasion as legitimate conduct but sometimes do evade. This
may happen because they feel supported by the sense that such conduct is
socially accepted and because, given that the situation is exceptional, they
experience no subsequent harm to their self-concept. This situation is related to the ethical culture and conditions in which dishonest behavior can
be contagious (Gino et al., 2009), changing the behavior of some nonevaders.

Ineffective anti-evasion methods
This dimension explains 4% of data variance, reveals strong correlations,
and is theoretically relevant because it includes information related to the
efficiency of measures pursued by public authorities to stop evasion.
Table 6.
Qualitative data revealed that fines are ineffective due to a lack of
enforcement; people know that they probably won’t have to pay it. This
perception is stimulated by police officers, inspectors, and local judges
who understand Transantiago’s lack of social approval and the payment
difficulties due to social inequities. Therefore, authorities select those
who may be “forgiven” and omit or reduce the fine if needed. On the

Trip Planning
Table 5 lists items, factor loadings, and agreements related to trip
planning. The differences between the groups regain importance and
reflect a level of dissimilarity related to this dimension. The qualitative
step showed that one deficiency associated with Transantiago is that, at
certain hours of the day (usually early in the morning or late at night), it
can be difficult to find a location where users can add money to Bip!
7
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until now—have less or no impact on users. Based on this study’s factor
analysis, a dimension related to structural aspects could not be constructed
to explain data variance, and control measures seem to be ineffective.
This study was based on several assumptions, which are better
supported in light of the results presented here. First, the assumption
was made that to achieve a deeper understanding of fare evasion on
Transantiago from the perspective of consumer misbehavior, it was
relevant to also include the opinions of those who do not evade. The
results show that in some dimensions, differences in opinion regarding
each item can be significant and can therefore be identified and characterized in distinctive groups. Doing so allowed identification of specific risks and challenges for each, meaning that massive measures may
not be adequate to stop evasion (González et al., 2019). Additionally,
the data uncovered the relevance of social acceptance of evasion, revealing that in some conditions, evasion is considered acceptable and
this acceptance has affected more users.
As a case study, this paper approaches an extreme example of fare
evasion that has been on the rise for the last 13 years, contextualized by
the emergence of groups that publicly approve of and defend this
conduct. As such, the results cannot account for generalizations, but as
demonstrated with this research, the high levels of evasion in Santiago
de Chile may not be completely explained by a cost-benefit model based
on concrete individual incentives. Instead, this research observed evasion as a social phenomenon, revealing that public transport is a complex system embedded in society where it fulfills several expectations
that are not being met by Transantiago.
Other public transport systems experiencing consumer misbehavior
may benefit from incorporating a multidisciplinary perspective and a social approach to better understand the misbehavior, propose more holistic
solutions (not centered only on the individual’s decision making process),
and complement structural aspects that, although easy to identify and
measure, may not provide sufficient information to solve the problem.
This study demonstrated that evaders and non-evaders agree that
not paying fares is not necessarily evasion in certain situations. This
suggests the normative perspective from which people judge this conduct should be reconsidered. When facing the need to reevaluate
transportation-related public policy, it is advisable to propose free
passes for certain user groups, which would also help redefine and assert Transantiago’s image. As the results show, disapproval of
Transantiago’s overall service is higher than disapproval of the service
used during the survey. When a collective image is a stronger determinant of perceptions than experience is, the issue is a social problem that will not be solved by improving specific aspects of traveling.
Finally, the findings have also reoriented our future research on this
topic. Keeping up with the multidisciplinary perspective, we are now
questioning the role of public transport both on social inequality and
social exclusion/inclusion, which will surely be a useful approach for
policy makers and will reveal new issues to consider.

other hand, although turnstiles seem to be more effective, skipping the
turnstile is easy and there is no shame associated with this behavior;
several public lists on social media show ways of doing this.
Consequently, given the agreement percentages and qualitative data
mentioned, these control measures can be considered ineffective.
Fear of law enforcement
Although the relevance of fear of law enforcement seems low (it
explains a mere 3% of the variance) and reflects weaker correlations, its
analysis is useful for comparison with the anti-evasion methods dimension. Analyzing both distinguishes elements that might explain the
anti-evasion methods to date.
Turnstiles and fines seem ineffective (as shown by the anti-evasion
methods factor), possibly because they fail to trigger adequate fear in
users. As Table 7 illustrates, the presence of an inspector appears to be the
most effective dissuasion measure—and always reflects a more substantial
influence on the behavior of non-evaders than on that of evaders. This
could explain the collective efforts emerging on social networks and mobile apps to collaboratively avoid encounters with inspectors.
While higher fines also make people reflect on the risks associated
with evasion, when considering the qualitative step and the semantics
related to this dimension, increasing fines is not an optimal solution. If,
as some studies have established, evasion is significantly associated
with unemployment and a lack of economic resources, at some point,
individuals simply cannot afford the penalty fee (Troncoso and de
Grange, 2017; Guarda et al. 2016b). Considering Bijleveld (2007), a
better solution should be employing inspectors who require payment
and charge a small fee if they observe evasion. This procedure seems
more effective than prosecuting evaders later through the judicial
system, as is done in Chile.
Conceptual map
The six dimensions discussed produce a more precise methodology for
future research. Fig. 3 shows a proposed conceptual map, which can
contribute to a better understanding of evasion among Transantiago users
by graphing the main variables that determine each of the proposed dimensions from the factor analysis. For example, behavior and social norms
explain part of the evasion phenomenon and are related to variables such
as users’ norms and personal values, the perception of whether evasion is
an illegal act or not, planning levels before the trip, and the existence of
charging points, among others. Most of the variables are expressed in the
questionnaire by several items. Items related to “fine” and “ideology” were
co-related by the factor analysis in different dimensions. That is why these
two variables are not exclusive of one dimension.
Conclusions
This research has identified that motivation to pay or evade the bus fare
is mainly explained by social dimensions, such as social norms,
Transantiago’s image, users’ behavior, and users’ sociodemographic characteristics. Consequently, the transport system’s structural aspects and
control measures—where the authorities and researchers have been focused
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Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Behavior and Social Norms
Public transport service’s image
Public transport service’s image
Public transport service’s image
Public transport service’s image
Public transport service’s image
Public transport service’s image
Public transport service’s image
Public transport service’s image
Public transport service’s image
Social acceptance of evasion
Social acceptance of evasion
Social acceptance of evasion
Social acceptance of evasion
Trip planning
Trip planning
Ineffective anti-evasion measures
Ineffective anti-evasion measures
Fear of law enforcement
Fear of law enforcement
Not considered in the factor analysis
Not considered in the factor analysis
Not considered in the factor analysis
Not considered in the factor analysis
Not considered in the factor analysis
Not considered in the factor analysis
Not considered in the factor analysis
Not considered in the factor analysis
Not considered in the factor analysis

Evasion is a dishonest act
Evasion is disrespectful
Evasion damages other passengers
All public transport users should validate their Bip! cards upon boarding a bus
It is annoying when those who evade payment find a place to sit
Evasion is an irresponsible act
It is right to pay the bus fare
Not paying the bus fare is an illicit act
With more places in which to charge the Bip! card, there is no excuse to evade
My family values influence my behavior about paying bus fares
Evasion produces a feeling of guilt
Evasion is an acceptable action in some cases
I am afraid of sanctions for the act of evading payment
It is evasion when a Bip! card is not validated after being used on the metro
I am satisfied with Transantiago’s bus service
Bus service reflects concerned with the well-being of users
I am satisfied with this bus's service
People close to me are satisfied with Transantiago’s buses
Transantiago’s buses are safe
Transantiago’s buses are clean
Transantiago’s buses are regularly serviced and maintained
Ticket fare is cheap
The frequency of bus service suits my needs
If I lose my Bip! card, it is OK for me to evade payment
It is acceptable to evade payment if my card is out of funds
Evasion is a valid way of protesting
In general, evasion has become an acceptable act
I am concerned about keeping funds on my Bip! card
I am concerned about remembering to bring my Bip! card with me when I plan to take the bus
The turnstile is useful method for reducing evasion
The penalty fee stops evasion
It is frightening to evade when there is a Bip! card inspector
If the penalty fee were higher, I would think twice before evading
The experience of being inspected affects my trip negatively
The bus business only benefits companies that own buses
I would prefer to have another way to charge the Bip! card
People only evade payment to save money
The bus fare is too high for me, given my income
The pay zone helps to reduce evasion
Paying in cash is preferable to using the Bip! card
In general, evasion has become a daily act
Paying the bus fare is more important than paying for bread

*The mean difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

Dimension

Question

Table A1
42 Items of the Survey Answerable Using a Likert Scale.

2.45
2.40
2.28
2.66
2.26
2.43
2.77
2.39
2.65
2.32
2.20
3.00
2.64
2.34
2.24
1.78
1.92
1.66
1.95
1.90
1.92
1.45
2.17
2.89
3.04
2.91
2.88
2.53
2.75
2.30
2.23
2.93
2.78
2.74
3.41
2.98
2.87
3.34
2.66
2.18
3.25
1.44

0.57
0.59
0.57
0.61
0.61
0.57
0.58
0.54
0.64
0.91
0.75
0.63
0.73
0.53
0.73
0.50
0.55
0.58
0.51
0.48
0.36
0.41
0.57
0.63
0.57
0.77
0.50
0.92
1.22
0.71
0.48
0.62
0.70
0.73
0.54
0.69
0.60
0.67
0.60
0.64
0.46
0.34

253
252
253
253
252
251
253
250
252
252
253
253
253
253
252
253
253
253
253
253
246
253
253
253
253
253
253
253
253
250
253
252
253
253
250
250
252
253
250
247
253
253

3.29
3.24
3.09
3.41
3.14
3.12
3.44
3.11
3.19
3.30
2.85
2.32
3.10
3.03
2.54
1.88
2.12
1.89
1.96
1.86
1.85
1.68
2.37
2.14
2.43
2.22
2.78
3.79
3.89
2.34
2.22
3.18
3.28
2.39
3.16
3.39
2.56
3.12
3.00
2.00
3.38
1.95

0.52
0.54
0.70
0.44
0.79
0.62
0.32
0.62
0.69
0.74
0.92
0.80
0.66
0.61
0.82
0.49
0.63
0.66
0.56
0.47
0.56
0.67
0.62
0.64
0.65
0.76
0.68
0.26
0.13
0.88
0.75
0.61
0.73
0.81
0.71
0.55
0.85
0.80
0.59
0.62
0.40
0.74

Stand. Dev.

Mean

N

Mean

Stand. Dev.

Non-evaders

Evaders

250
250
250
250
249
250
250
249
250
250
249
250
250
248
250
248
250
248
250
250
243
250
249
250
250
247
250
250
250
248
249
245
245
249
240
248
248
250
250
249
250
249

N

12.68 *
12.45 *
11.41 *
11.66 *
11.75 *
9.98 *
11.15 *
10.52 *
7.35 *
12.04 *
7.95 *
9.07 *
6.21 *
10.22 *
3.73 *
1.59
3.01 *
3.28 *
0.05
0.67
1.15
3.37 *
2.89 *
10.51 *
8.73 *
8.77 *
1.47
18.48 *
15.63 *
0.58
0.06
3.50 *
6.52 *
4.39 *
3.42 *
5.71 *
4.05 *
2.77 *
4.93 *
2.54 *
2.38 *
7.74 *

Test-t

Mean Difference
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Table A2
Factor Loadings Matrix.
Question

Factor

Evasion is a dishonest act
Evasion is disrespectful
Evasion damages other passengers
All public transport users should validate their Bip! cards upon boarding a bus
It is annoying when those who evade payment find a place to sit
Evasion is an irresponsible act
It is right to pay the bus fare
Not paying the bus fare is an illicit act
With more places in which to charge the Bip! card, there is no excuse to evade
My family values influence my behavior about paying bus fares
Evasion produces a feeling of guilt
Evasion is an acceptable action in some cases
I am afraid of sanctions for the act of evading payment
It is frightening to evade when there is a Bip! card inspector
It is evasion when a Bip! card is not validated after being used on the metro
If the penalty fee were higher, I would think twice before evading
I am satisfied with Transantiago’s bus service
Bus service reflects concerned with the well-being of users
I am satisfied with this bus's service
People close to me are satisfied with Transantiago’s buses
Transantiago’s buses are safe
Transantiago’s buses are clean
Transantiago’s buses are regularly serviced and maintained
Ticket fare is cheap
The frequency of bus service is suits my needs
If I lose my Bip! card, it is OK for me to evade payment
It is acceptable to evade payment if my card is out of funds
Evasion is a valid way of protesting
In general, evasion has become an acceptable act
I am concerned about keeping funds on my Bip! card
I am concerned about remembering to bring my Bip! card with me when I plan to take the bus
The turnstile is useful method for reducing evasion
The penalty fee stops evasion
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1

2

3

4

5

6

.796
.779
.698
.693
.662
.658
.657
.597
.580
.576
.566
-0.564
.526
.518
.507
.488
.130
.053
.242
.128
.047
.083
.033
.085
.076
-0.378
-0.380
-0.432
-0.015
.506
.522
.022
.133

.106
.213
.098
.108
.067
.148
.206
.151
.029
.014
.139
-0.055
.168
.110
.006
-0.019
.724
.639
.599
.594
.583
.568
.534
.458
.425
.001
-0.028
-0.171
-0.124
.044
-0.004
.099
.188

.156
.184
.131
.105
.067
.209
.131
.182
.047
-0.029
.179
-0.427
.022
-0.132
.165
.059
.164
.080
-0.022
.296
.014
-0.197
-0.197
.292
.263
-0.623
-0.601
-0.455
-0.429
.175
.128
.057
.039

.076
.053
.038
.181
.127
.037
.200
.140
.121
.322
.005
.001
-0.056
-0.048
.100
.183
.037
-0.004
.060
.064
.098
.009
-0.095
-0.071
-0.041
-0.159
-0.082
-0.097
-0.018
.708
.694
.075
-0.048

.066
.084
.082
-0.012
.094
.026
-0.058
.022
-0.018
.098
.121
.012
.124
.106
-0.079
.234
.049
.042
-0.108
.051
.141
.129
.098
.011
.185
.049
-0.113
.045
-0.302
.023
.046
.624
.584

-0.092
-0.045
-0.210
.051
-0.174
-0.073
.110
.177
.052
.080
.068
.026
.269
.301
.095
.339
.121
.030
.032
.084
-0.061
-0.139
-0.056
.062
.062
.033
.088
.017
-0.097
-0.041
.041
.019
.007
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See Appendix Figs A1–A6.

Fig. A1. Boxplot of behavior and social norms.
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Fig. A2. Boxplot of public transport service’s image.
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Fig. A3. Boxplot of social acceptance of evasion.

Fig. A4. Boxplot of trip planning.

Fig. A5. Boxplot of anti-evasion ineffective measures.
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Fig. A6. Boxplot of fear of law enforcement.
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